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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
CAROLYN JOYCE BETTINGER, 
nka CAROLYN BOIES, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
CASS BETTINGER, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 880297-CA 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF CASE 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter under 
§78-2a-3, Utah Code Annotated, as an appeal from a final order 
entered in a civil proceeding. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court commit reversible error by 
interpreting paragraph 7 of the Divorce Decree to require that 
Defendant's equity in the parties1 marital residence be 
determined on the date of Plaintiff/AppellantTs remarriage? 
2. Did the trial court commit reversible error by 
construing the term "improvements" in paragraph 7 of the Divorce 
Decree, as only capital investments? 
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STATEMENT OF CASE 
A. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
A Decree of Divorce was entered in this matter on August 14, 
1980. The decree awarded the marital domicile of the parties to 
Plaintiff, subject to a lien in favor of Defendant. 
Shortly after the sale of the marital domicile on August 13, 
1987, a dispute arose as to the amount of the sale proceeds to 
which each party was entitled. When it appeared that the parties 
were unable to resolve the dispute by negotiation, Defendant 
filed a motion with the lower court to resolve the dispute. 
An evidentiary hearing was held before the Honorable David 
S. Young, Third District Court Judge, on February 9, 1988. On 
February 18, 1988, Judge Young issued a Memorandum Decision with 
respect to the issues raised by the parties. The Memorandum 
Decision was later incorporated into an Order dated March 11, 
1988 (hereinafter "subject order"). The subject order is the 
basis of Plaintiff1s appeal and Defendant's cross appeal. 
On March 18, 1988, Defendant filed a motion, pursuant to 
Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to amend the subject 
order or grant a new trial. However, before the lower court made 
a decision on the Rule 59 motion, Plaintiff filed a premature 
Notice of Appeal with this court on May 5, 1988 (Court of Appeals 
No. 88-0297 CA). The lower court denied Defendant's Rule 59 
motion by order dated September 13, 1988. Defendant thereafter 
filed this cross appeal on September 26, 1988. 
2 
Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Appeal in 
Case No. 88-0297-CA. On March 23, 1989, Plaintiff?s counsel 
filed a motion for an enlargement of time. 
Subsequently, the Court of Appeals granted Plaintiff's 
Motion for an Enlargement of Time and denied Defendant's Motion 
to Dismiss and Plaintiff filed her Appellant's brief on April 19, 
1989. 
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Decree of Divorce in this action entered on August 14, 
1980, clearly provided that Plaintiff was to be awarded the 
ownership of the family home subject to a lien in favor of 
Defendant. The relevant paragraph of the Decree is quoted on 
page 7, infra. The Decree further provided that the lien in 
favor of Defendant was "forecloseable" when the youngest child 
reached 18, or when the home was sold or when Plaintiff 
remarried. 
Plaintiff remarried on August 14, 1984 (Tr. 34). This was 
the first occurrence of an event making the lien to Defendant due 
and payable. 
Subsequent to Plaintiff's remarriage, Plaintiff demonstrated 
her clear understanding that she was the sole owner of the home 
and that Defendant was merely a lienholder (Tr. 54). She 
continued to live in the home for a period of approximately one 
year with her new husband (Tr. 7); at the time she first listed 
the home for sale, she was the only signer on the listing 
agreement (Tr. 8-9); she never provided Defendant with any 
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opportunity for input on the l i s t i n g pr ice of the home (Tr. 12); 
she i n s t r u c t e d the l i s t i n g r e a l t o r t h a t Defendant was not 
e n t i t l e d to any information concerning the l i s t i n g or offers for 
sa le (Tr. 9, 23); and she made s ign i f i can t c a p i t a l improvements o 
the home without p r io r not ice or consul ta t ion with Defendant (Tr. 
71) . 
At the time of P l a i n t i f f ' s remarriage, the market value of 
the home was SQS^OO.OO1 (Memorandum Decision, para. 2) and the 
unpaid balance of the mortgage $20,304.002 (Memorandum Decision, 
para. 3 ) . 
Short ly a f t e r P l a i n t i f f ' s remarriage, the p a r t i e s attempted 
to negot ia te a means to pay Defendant's equi ty (Tr. 34-35; 14-
15) . However, the n e g o t i a t i o n s were u n s u c c e s s f u l . Thus, 
P l a i n t i f f decided to s e l l the home (Tr. 35) . 
The home was f i r s t l i s t e d for sa le in 1984 (Tr. 35) . The 
l i s t i n g was renewed several times and continued u n t i l an offer 
was received to purchase the home in March, 1987, for $91,500.00 
(Tr. 46; Ex. 1 ) . P l a i n t i f f accepted the offer and sa le took 
place on August 13, 1987 (Ex. 1 ) . The c o s t s of s a l e were 
$6,113.00 (Memo. Decision, para. 4; Ex. 1 ) . 
xThe value stated in the text represents the Court's findings. P la in t i f f ' s expert tes t i f ied 
the value of the home in August, 1984 was $89,000.00 (Tr. 65; Ex. 7). Defendant's expert stated 
a value of $100,000.00 (Tr. 21; Ex. 4). 
2The Court's finding as to the amount of the unpaid mortgage balance was taken from Exhibit 
2. 
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It was apparent that the market value of the home decreased 
between August 30, 1984 (the date that Plaintiff remarried) and 
August 13, 1987 (the date the home was sold) (Tr. 22, 69). 
In October, 1984, one month after Plaintiff's remarriage, 
and during her occupancy of the home with her new husband, 
Plaintiff expended $164.79 for screens on the home (Memo. 
Decision, para. 5). In the summer of 1986, approximately two 
years after Plaintiff's remarriage, Plaintiff expended $7,800.00 
for roof repairs and reconstruction of the roof of the home 
(Memo. Decision, para. 5; Tr. 38-43). These improvements were 
made by Plaintiff without any prior notice or acquiesence of 
Defendant (Tr. 71). 
The decline in the real estate market between August, 1984 
(date of remarriage) and August, 1987 (date of sale) more than 
offset the increase in the value of the home by reason of the 
improvements made by Plaintiff (Tr. 22, 69). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. The Court construed the Decree of Divorce in accordance 
with the established rules of construction and its interpretation 
of paragraph 7, with regard to the date of Defendant's equity 
determination, should be upheld. 
II. The Court erred in holding that Defendant was liable 
for the costs of any improvements made after Plaintiff's 
remarriage. 
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ARGUMENT 
INCORPORATION OF BRIEF OF CROSS APPELLANT 
Many of the arguments made by Plaintiff are examined and 
assessed in Defendants brief in support of his cross appeal. 
Defendant hereby incorporates by reference all points and 
authorities stated therein. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The law in Utah, regarding the standard of appellate review 
of a divorce action is quite clear. The appellate court will not 
disturb the findings of the trial court unless clear abuse of 
discretion is shown. Boyle vs. Boyle, 735 P. 2d 669 (Utah App. 
1987); Smith vs. Smith, 738 P. 2d 655 (Utah App. 1987). The 
applicable standard of review is as follows: 
"While the Supreme Court may review 
questions of both law and fact in 
equity cases, it is not bound to 
substitute its judgment for that of 
the trial court, and because of 
trial court's advantage position, 
Supreme Court gives considerable 
deference to its findings and 
judgment". See Hunter vs. Hunter, 
669 P.2d 430 (Utah 1983). 
The party appealing the order entered by the trial court 
must show that the evidence clearly preponderates against the 
trial court's findings or that the court has abused its 
discretion. Thompson vs. Thompson, 709 P.2d 360 (Utah 1985). In 
the instant action, Plaintiff has failed to meet either of the 
aforementioned standards. 
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POINT I 
THE TERMS OF THE SUBJECT ORDER WITH REGARD TO THE DATE 
AT WHICH DEFENDANT'S EQUITY IN THE MARITAL HOME WAS 
DETERMINED AND THE INTERPRETATION OF PARAGRAPH 7 OF THE 
DECREE WAS PROPERLY ENTERED BY THE LOWER COURT 
A, INTERPRETATION 
Plaintiff contends that the lower court erred in its 
interpretation of paragraph 7 of the Divorce Decree. 
Defendant acknowledges the legal principle that the language 
of judgments is subject to construction according to rules that 
apply to all written instruments. Moon Lake Water Users 
Association vs. Hanson, 535 P.2d 1262 (Utah 1975). The rule of 
construction and interpretation of instruments is set forth in 
Utah Valley Bank vs. Tanner, 636 P.2d 1060 (Utah 1981). In Utah 
Valley, the Utah Supreme Court held: 
"The basic rule of contract 
interpretation is that the intent 
of the parties is to be ascertained 
from the content of the instrument 
itself, the rationale for the rule 
being to preserve the sanctity of 
written instruments". Utah Valley, 
supra at 1061. 
The paragraph of the Divorce Decree that is in contention 
states as follows: 
"7. Plaintiff is awarded the real 
property of the marriage in the 
form of a home located at 2740 East 
4510 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
subject to a lien thereon for one-
half of the equity that may be in 
the h o u s e at the time of 
liquidation (which contemplates an 
increasing equity as the value 
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increases). The equity is defined 
as the fair market value or sales 
price at the time Defendant becomes 
entitled to liquidate his lien as 
set forth herein, less the amount 
of mortgages, costs of improvements 
made by Plaintiff and costs of 
sale. This lien shall not be 
forecloseable until the youngest 
child reaches 18, or until the home 
is sold or until Plaintiff 
remarries". 
The first sentence of paragraph 7 establishes Defendantf s 
interest in the marital domicile, i.e., "subject to a lien 
thereon for one-half of the equity that may be in the house at 
the time of liquidation (which contemplates an increasing equity 
as the value increases. 
The second sentence merely defines the term equity. 
The third sentence delineates the triggering mechanism which 
is required to happen before Defendant may foreclose on his lien. 
Foreclosure is defined as: "to shut out, to bar, to destroy 
an equity of redemption. A termination of all rights of the 
mortgagor or his grantee in the property covered by the 
mortgage". Black's Law Dictionary, Revised 4th Edition. 
Defendant did not have this right to terminate all his 
rights in the property until one of the aforementioned events 
occurred. However, upon the occurrence, the right vested in 
Defendant. 
It is obvious that the parties intended that Defendant's 
equity in the marital domicile would be determined upon the 
occurrence of one of three events: (a) then the youngest child 
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reaches 18; (b) when the home is sold; or, (c) when the Plaintiff 
remarries. 
On August 30, 1984, Plaintiff remarried. At this time, 
Defendant's equity in the marital domicile was determined. The 
trial court acknowledged this as the plain language 
interpretation of the Divorce Decree and its interpretation 
should be upheld. 
B. EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE NEED NOT BE CONSIDERED 
Plaintiff argues that the Court, in order to construe the 
ambiguities in paragraph 7 of the Decree, is required to look at 
the evidence in the record to ascertain the intent of the parties 
when drafting paragraph 7. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held, "Where possible, the 
underlying intent of the contract is to be gleaned from the 
language of the instrument itself. The mere fact that the 
parties urge diverse definitions of contract terminology does not 
per se, render it ambiguous". Land vs. Land, 605 P.2d 248 (Utah 
1980). 
The Decree of Divorce entered on August 14, 1980, by the 
Honorable James Sawaya, was entered pursuant to negotiated 
stipulation of both the parties. (Record pp. 21-24 attached as 
Exhibit A hereto). 
At the time of the decree, Plaintiff was represented by 
counsel, Robert B. Sykes, and in fact counsel for Plaintiff 
drafted the Decree of Divorce (see Exhibit A). 
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Plaintiff now argues that the instrument, drafted by her 
counsel, is ambiguous and that the lower court resorted to 
extrinsic evidence for its interpretation and the Court's finding 
and ruling is in error. The argument that the Decree of Divorce 
is ambiguous must be viewed in light of the fact that it was 
counsel for Plaintiff who drafted the order. 
The intent of the parties can be ascertained from the plain 
language of the instrument and there is no need to resort to 
extrinsic evidence• 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT DEFENDANT 
WAS LIABLE FOR THE COSTS OF IMPROVEMENTS MADE AFTER 
PLAINTIFF'S REMARRAIGE AND COSTS OF SALE OF THE HOME 
With respect to Plaintiff's claim that the trial courts 
interpretation of the term "improvements by Plaintiff", is in 
error, Defendant incorporates by reference his arguments set 
forth in Section I of the Brief of Cross Appellant. A copy of 
said section is attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court correctly determined that Mr. Bettinger's 
equity in the marital domicile was to be determined at the time 
of Plaintiff's remarriage, and the lower court's ruling in this 
regard should be upheld. 
The trial court's ruling on the issue of improvements should 
be reversed and the case remanded for entry of judgment in favor 
of Defendant and against Plaintiff as follows: 
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Judgment in the sum of $7,039.00 representing the difference 
between the $30,309,00 awarded by the Court and $37,348,00 which 
represented the amount of Defendantf s lien together with interest 
at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum from August 30, 1984 
to date of judgment. x"~\ 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED/THIS [ \ DAY OF MAY, 1989. 
Rbbert M. McDonald 
Attorney for Defendant/Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the • u day of May, 1989, I 
served a true and accurate copy of the foregoing Brief of 
Respondent upon the following named persons by depositing said 
document in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed as 
follows: 
Craig M. Peterson 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON> 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 8t4lf02 \ , \ \ j < 
- \ i r ; •' - / { 
i i 
i-iLtu IN CLERKS OFFICE 
Salt Lake County, Utah 
MG 141980 
EXHIBIT A 
4 •W^ffTfr.n.flt. 
Court ROBERT B. SYKES 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
261 East 300 South, Suite 210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 533-0222 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
4J-/JT9 A/fi . ***** 
CAROLYN JOYCE BETTINGER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CASS BETTINGER, 
Defendant, 
*-//-/> - *'•&& #M. 
i DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. D-80-931 
On the 1st day of August, 1980, this matter came before 
the above-entitled Court, the Honorable James Sawaya, District 
Judge, presiding. Both parties were present and the Plaintiff 
was represented by Attorney Robert B. Sykes, and Defendant was 
represented by Attorney Delwin T. Pond. Counsel for Plaintiff 
presented an oral stipulation regarding the complete settlement 
of this matter, which stipulation was acknowledged to be correct 
by Defendant and ordered by the Court to be incorporated in the 
Findings of Fact and Decree. Based upon the foregoing, and good 
cause otherwise appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. Plaintiff is granted a Decree of Divorce from 
Defendant on the grounds of mental cruelty, the same to become 
final six months from the date of entry. 
2. Plaintiff is granted care, custody and control of 
the four (4) minor children of this marriage, to wit: 
MICHELLE, born June 19, 1967 
CHRISTOPHER CASS, born January 15, 19 71 
JONATHON SCOTT, born March 11, 1972 
NICOLE, born January 4, 1977 
Defendant shall have reasonable visitation with each of the 
children upon reasonable notice. 
3. Defendant is ordered to pay for child support the j 
i 
amount of $200.00 per month per child for a total of $800.00 per ; 
month at the time of this Decree. One-half of the total sum for I 
child support is payable on or before the first (1st) day of I 
every month beginning August 1, 1980, and the balance is payable 
on or before the sixteenth (16th) day of every month thereafter. 
Payment is to be made by way of check. I 
4. Defendant is ordered to increase the amount of j 
I 
child support payments each year on August 1 by an amount of 8 j 
I 
percent. j 
5. Plaintiff is granted alimony in the amount of $1.00 j 
i 
per year. j 
6. Defendant is ordered to keep in force all medical * ; 
insurance on the children which he has through his employment. j 
Defendant is further ordered to pay any major or unusual medical i 
or dental expenses such as orthodonic braces. j 
7. Plaintiff is awarded the real property of the j 
I 
marriage in the form of a home located at 2740 East 4510 South, j 
i 
Salt Lake City, Utahf subject to a lien thereon for one-half of j ! 
! 
the equity that may be in the house at the time of liquidation 
(which contemplates an increasing equity as the value increases). 
The equity is defined as the fair market value or sales price at 
the time Defendant becomes entitled to liquidate his lien as set 
forth herein, less the amount of mortgages, costs of improvements i 
made by Plaintiff and costs of sale. This lien shall not be 
forecloseable until the youngest child reaches 18 , or until the 
home is sold or until Plaintiff remarries. On the occurrence of j 
i 
i 
any of these events, two-thirds of the house payments then made j 
! 
shall be converted to child support and that sum shall be paid to j 
the Plaintiff on a monthly basis as additional child support. j 
8. Defendant is ordered to continue making the i 
payments on the home. Defendant shall also be entitled to take 
the entire interest portion of the house payment as a deduction i 
for himself as well as three (3) income tax exemptions on the 
children with Plaintiff to receive one exemption on the youngest 
child at the present time, 
9. With respect to personal property, Defendant is 
awarded his books, the stereo (with two speakers to be left 
behind), a cock bench, two swivel chairs, a moro chest, enough 
bedding, kitchen utensils, etc. to start his own household, the 
Toyota Celica, subject to the balance owed thereon, a lamp from 
India, the bookcase wall unit, as well as his own personal 
effects, clothing, knick-knacks, and such other personal property 
as the parties may divide among themselves. Plaintiff is awarded 
the balance of the personal property. Each party will assume and 
I 
pay any obligations on any of the property awarded by the I 
Decree. 
10. Defendant is ordered to assume and pay all i 
i 
household debts through the date of the Decree as well as those ! 
i 
specified in the Complaint. 
11. The Stipulation entered into by the parties in open j 
court on August 1, 1980, is incorporated into this Decree by j 
reference. • 
i 
12. Defendant is ordered to maintain life insurance ! 
payable to Plaintiff and/or the children in a sufficient amount 
to protect the expectancy interest of the children to child 
support during their minority. i 
13. Plaintiff is awarded $200.00 judgment for 
j 
attorney's fees against Defendant, which Defendant should pay | 
within thirty (30) days. j 
DATED this /</ day of August 1980. j 
i 
I 
BY THE COURT: ; 
/ yf ; 
! 
/^TOflORABLE JAMES SAW AY A 
^ D i s t r i c t Court Judge 
ATTEST 
W. STERLING EVANS 
BY, > i w ^ ( ^ 
6 eputy Ciyrfc 
-vAtv.i?:* 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Hand Delivery 
I hereby certify that I served a copy of the 
foregoing DECREE OF DIVORCE upon Mr. Delwin Pond, Attorney 
for Defendant by causing a true and correct copy thereof to 
be hand delivered to said person at his office at the 
following address: 
Mr. Delwin T. Pond 
Attorney at Law 
1174 East 2700 South 
Salt Lake Cityf UT 
on this 13th day of August, 1980. 
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EXHIBIT-ii 
A. COSTS OF IMPROVEMENTS 
The lanquaae :v:thoriziny deduction of costs of improvements 
clearly refers ' o i .up: \ vements made prior to the date Defendant's 
lien becan> *: ** -.: payable inasmuch as the i a n g u a g e author i zi nq 
. • .. :*-:^ced by t:l le words «:nt the time Defendant 
becomes entitled to liquidate his liei i"" ' Moreover, it is 
apparent that ii cue language made reference to i n . • . -
after thp lipn was payable, Defendant would be j a y m g : . 
improvements * ^m-tift 's home with no possibility to benefit 
uy any increase *• - -» - c: easoi 1 :: f t:l: le i mpr ovemei i fcs . 
The roof repair and replacement of $7,800.00 was undertaken 
:n the summer of 1986, after rh<-- • irne -laintiff remarried rr. 
w;, ,i aDoui October . * ~>4 .^  r - ^ : PI a; .titf's remarriage (Memo 
Decision para. 5 ) . ' Both expenditures occurred while Plaintiff 
W'is ' htj sole '^WiiF't • ' t Mif 11" in*-1 an 1 while Defendant's interest was 
limited to his lien Plaintiff's claim that Defendant must bear 
one-half of tl le costs wi uir • improvements y 
i i icoi isis tei it wi 1:1 i *.* concept o* -.* rights and .,. •. igation- cf 
lienholders, fat11: I i nconsistent with Plaintiff's actions at the 
time the improvements were maae. P *• re 
vem»i: -: . - a^y r>r-> ^r- notic- . o u s u i t a U ^ n ;ith 
Defendant 
Defendant ncrn n 
holding that secured indebtedness is decreased by the costs of 
improvements to the collateral. The improvements benefit only 
the debtor. Utah Code Annotated §78-37-43 . 
Plaintiff's claims are made with the benefit of hindsight--
knowledge that real estate values decreased after August, 1984. 
It is readily apparent that if the market forces together with 
the improvements had enhanced the market value of the home so 
that the selling price in 1987 exceeded the 1984 market value, 
Plaintiff would be claiming sole entitlement to the benefit of 
the increase.4 This Court should not permit Plaintiff to compel 
Defendant to bear a portion of the loss from the decline in the 
market when he could not have shared in the gain had the market 
increased. 
B. COSTS OF SALE 
Paragraph 7 of the decree gran ts Defendant a l i e n on the 
home as of the date of the decree (August 14, 1980). The amount 
of t h e l i e n v a r i e d with t he va lue of t h e home u n t i l t he 
occur rence of one of t h r e e even t s : " . . . t h e youngest ch i l d 
r eaches 18, or u n t i l t h e home i s sold , or u n t i l P l a i n t i f f 
remarr ies" . 
3Utah Code Annotated §78-37-4 clearly provides that sale proceeds from the collateral which 
are in excess of the indebtedness go to the debtor if there are no junior liens. 
Paragraph 7 of the decree clearly provides that Defendant benefits from increases in equity 
only until Plaintiff remarries (or the occurrence of one of the other triggering events). 
Defendant s share of the equity was frozen on that date. Thus, had the value of the home 
increased after Plaintiff's remarriage, she would be entitled to the full amount of the increase. 
Inasmuch as Defendant is precluded from sharing in any increase in value after Plaintiff's 
remarriage, he should likewise be insulated from any decrease in value during the same period. 
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